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"A work of art.., is aform createdby the artistout
of human experience. At the same time it has a
culturalcontext. It exists in time, anditsform reflects
the forces of that of that time--social, economic,
political,and religious."I
INTRODUCTION

It was only recently that United States law recognized the
substance of that statement. The copyright protection afforded in this
country for most of its existence only recognized the economic,
utilitarian purposes of protecting art.' In 1990, the United States
joined the world copyright community in recognizing the "moral
rights" visual artists have in their creations. 3 This right encompasses
the personal and spiritual component that an artist embodies in her
work.4
United States copyright law also recognizes the employer's rights
in the creation of copyrightable works. The work made for hire
provision of the 1976 Copyright Act5 entitles an employer to
copyright ownership in a work created and/or produced by its
employee-creator.6 An employer's ownership right is "entrenched"
in United States copyright law to provide financial incentives to
create. 7
Based on the theory that moral rights can only be exercised by a
creator of art and that this right exists independently of the economic

1. 136 CONG. REC. 12,609 (1990) (statement of Rep. Markey) (quoting Helen
Gardner, arts scholar and historian).
2. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyrightand the MoralRight: Is an American
Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 1 (1985) (noting the United States
"tradition of safeguarding only the pecuniary rights of a copyright owner").
3. Visual Artists Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128, 5128-33
(1990) [hereinafter "VARA"] (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). VARA
only protects moral rights in works of visual art. See infra Part I.
4. See Kwall, supra note 2, at 7 (describing moral rights as derived from a
creator "project[ing] his personality into his work").
5. 17 U.S.C. § 201 (b) (1994).
6. See infraPart II.
7. See Kwall supranote 2, at 71.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss2/3
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right in exploiting the copyrighted work, both of the following
statements shouldbe true: 1) An employer of a work made for hire
cannot exercise moral rights in the work, but enjoys the economic
right in'the copyrighted work; and 2) an employee-creator whose
work is a work made for hire can exercise her moral rights but cannot
enjoy the economic right in the copyright. Under the current
interpretation of copyright doctrine in the United States, the first
assertion is true but the second is not. The theories suggest that moral
and economic rights should live in harmony, but U.S. copyright law
demonstrates that these rights clash in a work for hire situation, with
moral rights the sacrificed element!
This Article concerns the clash between the work made for hire
doctrine and the moral rights doctrine. The consequence of a work
for hire determination is especially damaging to an artist's moral
rights when the protection of irreplaceable art work from destruction
is extinguished based on a finding of an employer-employee
relationship. This consequence is illustrated by the recent Second
Circuit decision in Carterv. Helmsley-Spear,Inc.9 where three artists
were denied injunctive relief to prohibit the defendant building
owners from modifying or destroying the artists' walk-through
sculpture in the lobby of defendant's building. The Second Circuit
denied relief under the Visual Arts Rights Act (hereinafter VARA or
Act), holding that this art was a work made for hire and therefore fell
outside of the statutory protection.
The clash of economic rights and moral rights involves two areas
of copyright doctrine and, therefore, this Article reviews both
doctrines and provides suggestions for harmonizing them. Part I
explores the backdrop of moral rights abroad and the recent
acceptance of those rights in the United States. Part II reviews the
work made for hire provision and the Supreme Court's decision in
Communityfor CreativeNon-Violence v. Reid. ° Part III illustrates
the essence of the conflict through a review of Carterv. HelmsleySpear, Inc. Part IV analyzes the conflict and recommends ways to
8. See infra Part IH.
9. 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1824 (1996); see infra Part
HI.
10. 490 U.S. 730 (1989); see infra Part II.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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harmonize these competing interests.
This Article suggests that the current "Reid Factors" for
determining employee status be applied in a more consistent fashion,
with an eye towards vindicating the purposes of current U.S. moral
rights legislation. However, the ultimate remedy for this clash
between the rights of the employer and employee-artist cannot be
fully realized with ajudicial test and must be addressed legislatively.
Thus, the advocated approach is a recognition of moral rights for
employee-artists.
I. MORAL RIGHTS BACKGROUND

A. Moral Rights Theory
The theory of moral rights, or droit moral, distinguishes the
economic component of a created work from the embodiment of the
creator's personality in the work." Thus, the creator's economic
rights in her work exist independently of her personal rights. It is the
protection of the creator's personal expression and spiritual
2
embodiment within her work which constitute her moral rights.'
European and other countries have long recognized the theory of
moral rights, although there is no uniform concept between the
foreign jurisdictions."3 Despite the international inconsistency, the
largest international agreement on copyright does attempt to provide
a broad provision for moral rights recognition. 4 This agreement,
well known as the Berne Convention, provides a model for moral
rights and serves as a basis for current U.S. legislation. A brief
overview of this international agreement is useful to illustrate the
U.S. recognition of moral rights.
11. Edward J. Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward a
FederalSystem of Moral Rights ProtectionFor Visual Art, 39 CATH. U.L. REV.
945,949(1990). See Kwall, supra,note 2, at 5-10 for discussion of the moral right
components with accompanying hypothetical.
12. See Damich, supranote 11, at 949 (noting that the legal protection of this
personal component gives rise to the moral right).
13. Kwall, supranote 2, at 9-10.
14. William Belanger, US. Compliance with the Berne Convention, 3 GEO.
MASON INDEP. L. REV. 373 (1995).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss2/3
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1. The Berne Convention
The Berne Convention for the International Union for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 5 (known as the Berne
Convention) currently has 84 members.' 6 The Berne Convention's
concept of moral rights is found in Article 6bis.'7 The language of
Article 6bis defines a creator's moral rights to include claims of
authorship and prevention of distortion or alteration to the creator's
work which would damage honor or reputation.'
Article 6bis
provides two types of moral rights for creators: the right of
attribution and the right of integrity.
A creator's claim to attribution represents her right to attach her
name to her work.' 9 This right of attribution also works in the
converse since it gives the creator the right to anonymity and the right
15. Berne Convention for the International Union for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works, reprintedin MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT, app. 27 (1996) [hereinafter Berne Convention]. This treaty was
opened for signature Sept. 9, 1886, and was last revised in Paris on July 24, 1971.
Id. at 27-1.
16.

MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY (1990). The United States did not become a Berne Convention member
until 1988. See infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text for the historical
background.
17. This concept is defined in Article 6bis:
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after
the transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to
claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion,
mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action
in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his
honor or reputation.
Berne Convention, supranote 15, at 27-6.
18. Id
19. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, GUIDE TO THE
BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS

(Paris act, 1971) (1978) [GUIDETO THE BERNE COVENTION]. The official comment
to Article 6bis states: "This provision enshrines two of the author's prerogatives:
first and foremost to claim the paternity of his work -- to assert that he is its
creator." Id at 41.

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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to publish under a pseudonym.20
The right of integrity serves to protect the physical integrity of a
Creator's work.2 ' Article 6bis gives a creator a mechanism to prohibit
mutilation or distortion which damages the physical integrity of her
work.22 The right of integrity also protects against "other derogatory
action" which affects the work and results in prejudice to the creator's
23
"honor or reputation."
The text of the Berne Convention indicates a broad scope of works
which are covered by moral rights.2 4 The Beme Convention covers
' Although
"the rights of authors in their literary and artistic works."25
the text provides protection for most works, it also contains language
which gives member countries the discretion to narrow the works
covered by moral rights.
Article 6bis does not address whether moral rights are alienable
and/or waivable. Although specific language addressing these issues
is absent, commentators have interpreted Article 6bis moral rights as
inalienable and nonwaivable.26 Others have suggested that the silence
20. Id The official comment to Article 6bis continues: "The right of paternity
may be exercised by the author as he wishes; it can even be used in a negative way,
i.e., by publishing his work under a pseudonym or by keeping it anonymous ......
Id.
21. See supranote 17 for text of Article 6bis.
22. Id.
23. Id; see Damich, supra note 11, at 950-951 (indicating the broad scope of
Article 6bis mandates not only physical integrity for originals, but also the right of
faithful reproduction for paintings, drawings, prints, sculptures, and photographs).
But see Kwall, supra note 2, at 11 n.39 (noting some scholarly criticism of the
limited scope of Article 6bis right of integrity). This criticism centers on the
prejudice requirement. Id.
24. See Damich, supranote 11, at 953 (noting that "[n]othing in the text of the
Berne Convention indicates that the moral rights of Article 6bis do not apply to all
works protected by the Convention").
25. See Berne Convention, supra note 15, at 27-2. Article 2 of the Berne
Convention covers "literary and artistic works." The text covers "every production
in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of
its expression." Id.
26. See, e.g., Damich, supranote 11, at 967 (finding evidence of inalienablitiy
and nonwaivability in the text of Article 6bis and the official interpretation of the
Berne Convention). Damich refers to the phrase from paragraph one in Article 6bis
for support: moral rights exist "[i]ndependently of the author's economic rights,
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss2/3
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in Article 6bis indicates an intention that issues of alienability should
be left to the discretion of each member country. 7
Article 6bis explicitly provides for the duration of moral rights
protection for the author. The second paragraph contains language
recognizing the existence of moral rights after the death of the author
until the expiration of her copyright. 8 There is a loophole, however,
to compliance. The Article allows member countries to cut off moral
rights after the author's death.29
While the United States had remained an outsider to the Berne
Convention community for over 100 years,30 it more recently realized
the important global future in technology and moved to protect its
investments abroad. An important step into the global copyright
community for the U.S. was the Berne Convention Implementation
Act of 1988 (BCIA) 1 Although this legislation served to give U.S.
membership status, it relied on future domestic legislation to adopt
the Berne Convention provisions. 2 Such legislation was finally
and even after the transfer of the said rights." Berne Convention, supra note 15,
at 27-6.
27. See, e.g., Melville B. Nimmer, Implications of ProspectiveRevisions of the
Berne Convention and the United States CopyrightLaw, 19 STAN. L. REV. 499,

523-24 (1967).
28. Berne Convention, supra note 15, at 27-7. Paragraph 2 of Article 6bis

provides: "The rights granted to the author in accordance with the preceding
paragraph shall, after his death, be maintained, at least until the expiry of the
economic rights, and shall be exercisable by the persons or institutions authorized
by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed." Id.
29. Id. The loophole provides:

However, those countries whose legislation, at the moment of
their ratification of or accession to this Act, does not provide for
the protection after the death of the author of all the rights set out
in the preceding paragraph may provide that some of these rights

may, after his death, cease to be maintained.
Id
30. See Belanger, supra note 14, at 373, for insight into why the U.S. refused

to join the Berne Convention. One reason offered for the self imposed isolation by
the U.S. has been the difference between the fundamental philosophical
underpinnings of copyright law in common law and civil law countries. Id.
31. Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988).
32. See Belanger, supra note 14, at 374 (highlighting that a central feature of

BCIA "was its declaration that the Berne Convention isnot self executing, and thus
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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passed in 1990 in the Visual Artists Rights Act.3 As the next section
demonstrates, VARA's provisions are afirst step to compliance with
the Berne Convention's concept of moral rights.
B. The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
"In the last part of the 20th century, the United States has become
the financial, political, and intellectual capital of the world. We also
have become the arts capital of the world. With that leading status
comes the responsibility for fostering, protecting and encouraging the
arts."" As the above statement suggests, Congress perceived the
United States changing role in the world copyright community as
necessitating the enactment of VARA. As originally proposed,
VARA provided for moral rights protection similar to the concept
embodied in the Berne Convention's Article 6bisY' In the end,
though, VARA was passed with narrow protections for moral rights.36
In general, VARA provides an author with the rights of attribution
and integrity, but only for specific works of visual art." These rights
are not transferable, although they may be waived by the author. 8
The Act limits the duration of the rights to the life of the author,
its implementation depends entirely on domestic legislation").
33. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128, 5128-33 (1990) (codified in scattered
sections of 17 U.S.C.).
34. 136 CONG. REC. H8271 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Markey).
35. Senator Edward Kennedy and Representative Robert Kastenmeirer
introduced two moral rights bills to the 101st Congress. See S. 1198, 101st Cong.
(1989); H.R. 2690, 101st Cong. (1990); see also Damich, supra note 11, at 951974 (analyzing these two proposed bills).
36. The Congressional record reflects the attitude many members of Congress
had towards moral rights: "[S]o-called moral or artists rights, with their
noneconoimc, [sic] subjective underpinnings do not fit neatly within our copyright
act." 136 CONG. REC. 12,610 (1990) (statement of Rep. Fish). Such sentiment
had the overall effect of shaving down the proposed acts.
37. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994).
38. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (e). See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text for
further discussion.

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss2/3
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extinguishing at death. 9 There is an additional provision for
situations involving a work incorporated into a building.40 VARA
also has a preemptive effect on state statutes that similarly protect
moral rights.41
The next three subsections explore VARA's significant contours:
1) identified rights; 2) works covered; and 3) individuals protected.
Each subsection compares VARA's provisions to correlating
provisions in Berne Convention's Article 6bis. As one commentator
observed, "while recognizing the importance of... [VARA], it must
be acknowledged that the Act does not bring United States law into
conformity with Article 6bis."42
1. IdentifiedRights
The Act recognizes both Article 6bis rights to attribution and
integrity in certain respects. VARA, in fact, is captioned "Rights of
'43
certain authors to attribution and integrity.
The right of attribution includes the creator's right to claim
authorship for her work or disclaim authorship for works she did not
create." This right also permits a creator a cause of action to prevent
39. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (d). In works created before the effective date of VARA
that have not been transferred from the author, the moral rights term is the same as
the copyright term. Id. Article 6bis provides, on the other hand, that moral rights
exist until the expiration of the creator's economic rights. Berne Convention, supra
note 15, at 27-7. See notes 28-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Article 6bis and the duration of moral rights.
40. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d); see infra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
41. 17 U.S.C. § 301(0(2). There are currently 11 states with their own moral
right statutes. See ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUss & ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADEMARK, COPYRIGHT

PATENT LAW, 318-361 (1996). VARA preempts a state law action unless it
involves a work commenced before VARA's effective date, involves a nonequivalent right, or arises from posthumous violations. Some state statutes provide
moral rights protection for the life of a copyright. Id.
42. Damich, supranote 11, at 947.
43. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994).
44. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(A) & 03). The text provides:
(1) [An author] shall have the right -(A) to claim authorship of that work, and
AND

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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the use of her name on her work which has been distorted or
mutilated and has therefore prejudiced her honor or reputation.45
The right of attribution is narrower than the Article 6bis right. The
major difference between the two rests in the right of anonymity and
pseudonymity. Article 6bis expressly includes both of these rights in
its protection of moral rights.46 VARA, on the other hand, only
permits an author to prohibit use of her name if she did not create the
work or her work has been modified or distorted, thereby prejudicing
her reputation or honor.47 Therefore, VARA does not recognize a
moral right to remain anonymous or use a pseudonym if a work
remains unaltered.
The right of integrity has been described as "the most compelling
case for moral rights protection" since it protects "irreplaceable works
from irreversible physical changes.' s The right of integrity involves
two general rights to protect the physical integrity of a work: the
right to prevent distortion, mutilation, and modification and the right
to prevent destruction of a work.49
The right to prevent "distortion, mutilation or other modification"
(B) to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any
work of visual art which he or she did not create;
Id.
45. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(2) (1994). The text provides that the author:
(2) shall have the right to prevent the use of his or her name as
the author of the work of visual art in the event of a distortion,
mutilation, or other modification of the work which would be
prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation;
Id.; see Damich, supranote 11, at 958 (observing that the right of attribution--or
the right to disassociate one's name from a work--applies whether or not the
distortion or modification was intentional). Professor Damich further notes that
this right to attribution "is not exactly coextensive with the right or integrity." Id.
The right of integrity to prevent modification or destruction only applies to
intentional acts.
46. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
47. See supranote 45 and accompanying text.
48. Damich, supra note 11, at 950. Congress also recognized the vast
importance of protecting U.S. art from destruction or modification: "[I]t is
paramount to the very integrity of our culture that we preserve the integrity of our
artworks as expressions of the creativity of the artist." 136 CONG. REC. 12,609
(1990) (statement of Rep. Markey).
49. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A) & (B) (1994).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss2/3
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under VARA applies to any intentional act to a work which would
result in prejudice to the author's "honor or reputation."5 The
provision also provides a right to recover damages for past
modifications which are prejudicial.5
The right to prevent destruction is limited to "intentional or grossly
negligent destruction" of a "work of recognized stature. 52 The right
against destruction is broader than the right against distortion,
mutilation and other modification in two respects. First, the right
against destruction covers grossly negligent acts in addition to
intentional acts, although both of these requirements are inconsistent
with Article 6bis. Second, the right against destruction is also
broader than the right against modification because it is not limited
to acts which prejudice the author's honor or reputation. However,
the right against destruction is limited since it only protects works "of
recognized stature."53
This restriction to works recognized as having artistic merit is
arguably a divergence from Article 6bis and moral rights theory in
general.54 Although VARA does not define what a "work of
recognized stature" is, the legislative history suggests a court should
make this quality determination by reviewing opinions of art
experts." Congress probably added the artistic merit requirement to
50. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A).
51. Id. The text provides: "and any intentional distortion, mutilation, or
modification of that work isa violation of that right." See Damich, supranote 11,
at 961-962 for support of this interpretation.
52. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B). The text provides: "to prevent any destruction
of a work or recognized stature, and any intentional or grossly negligent destruction

of that work is a violation of that right." Id.; see Damich, supra note 11, at 962
(noting that "intentional or grossly negligent destructions are ipso facto violations

of the right").
53. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B).
54. See Damich, supranote 11, at 962 (finding this limitation "inconsistent with
moral rights theory, the Berne Convention and the United State's copyright law
tradition of refraining from judgments as to quality").

55. See Senate Bill 1198 which stated:
[A] court or other trier of fact may take into account the opinions
of artists, art dealers, collectors of fine art, curators of art

museums, conservators of recognized stature, and other persons
involved with the creation, appreciation, history, or marketing of
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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prevent nuisance law suits. 6 One commentator noted that despite the
potential for nuisance suits, this requirement "is so opposed to moral
rights theory" that it is not "an appropriate solution.""7
Despite the quality assessment necessitated by this "recognized
stature" requirement, it must be noted that Article 6bis does not
mention the right against destruction. 8 One commentator noted that
this omission should not "justify cutting down the right of integrity"
to only include the right against distortion or mutilation. 9 It could
therefore be argued that the Act is not inconsistent with Article 6bis
since VARA addresses an act (destruction) not expressly mentioned
by the Berne Convention."
Despite the recognition of the moral rights of attribution and
integrity, VARA provides that these rights may be waived by the
artist. The written waiver must specify the work, the uses the waiver
applies to and it must be signed by the author.61 Although Article
6bis is silent on whether moral rights are waivable, it has been
interpreted to prohibit waivers in order to protect the artist "from
works of recognized stature. Evidence of commercial
exploitation of a work as a whole, or of particular copies, does
not preclude a finding that the work is a work of recognized
stature.

S. 1198, 101st Cong. § 3(a) (1989).
56. See Damich, supra note 11, at 954-55 (describing such nuisance suits as
those arising from the "destruction of a five year old's finger painting").
57. Damich, supra note 11, at 955 (suggesting that a better solution would be
to limit damages to fair market value of the work).
58. Even so, destruction would likely fall under a "derogatory action." See
supranote 23 and accompanying text.
59. Damich, supranote 11, at 980.
60. See Kwall, supra note 2, at 9. Some jurisdictions have not recognized the
right against destruction based on an "underlying rationale that a work which has
been destroyed completely cannot reflect adversely upon the creator's honor or
reputation." Id However, some of these jurisdictions are now recognizing that an
artist's honor can be adversely affected by destruction. Namely, France has
recently recognized the right against destruction by protecting an author's right "to
have his work continuously and authentically express his personality." Damich,
supranote 11, at 980.
61. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1)-(2) (1994). The original Senate bill did not contain
a waiver provision, making moral rights unwaivable. S. 1198, 101st Cong. § 3
(1989).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss2/3
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herself' and from those parties who could exploit her weak
bargaining position.62
2. Works Covered
VARA explicitly defines which works are protected by moral
rights. The Act is primarily protective of unique, irreplaceable works
of visual art.63 Visual art under VARA includes paintings, drawings,
prints, sculptures, and still photographs. The Act further limits
protection to those works which exist in limited editions of 200
copies or fewer.' Visual art does not include works such as useful
articles, applied art, motion pictures or other audio-visual work,
charts and other technical drawings, books, magazines and other
periodicals, advertising items or any work made for hire.65
62. Damich, supra note 11, at 967 (noting that because artists often have very
weak bargaining powers, a waiver provision may result in the elimination of moral
rights).
63. The narrow category of works in VARA was a deliberate selection by
Congress to preserve fine art. Many members of Congress viewed the narrow
category as the maximum concession for moral rights: "This legislation [VARA]
should not be viewed as a precedent for the extension of so-called moral rights into
other areas." 136 CONG. REC. 12,610 (1990) (statement of Rep. Fish).
64. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). The definition of visual art:
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single
copy, in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed
and consecutively numbered by the author, or, in the case of a
sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures of
200 or fewer that are consecutively numbered by the author and
bear the signature or other identifying mark of the author; or
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes
only, existing in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in
a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and
consecutively numbered by the author.
Id.; see Damich, supranote 11, at 976 (wondering where the number 200 for the
limited edition requirement came from). "The figure does not seem to
correspond with the exhaustion point of a lithographic stone or metal plate or of
a photographic negative ...

."

Damich, supranote 11, at 976.

65. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
A work of visual art does not include -(A)(i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing,
diagram, model, applied art, motion picture or other audioPublished by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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The narrow category of works protected by VARA falls short of the
concept of moral rights embodied in Article 6bis. While VARA
protects a specific category of visual art, the Berne Convention
provides a broad definition of literary and artistic works covered by
Article 6bis.6 6 One commentator optimistically noted that despite the
narrow scope of VARA's protected works, that "protecting
irreplaceable works is a logical starting point" for the United States.6 7
Works that become part of a building are also covered by moral
rights.6" VARA deals separately with those works incorporated into
buildings based on the difficult removal problems that these works
pose.69 Congress specifically dealt with the removal problem by
splitting the VARA provision to cover two situations. The first
situation involves works that cannot be removed without mutilating,
distorting or destroying the work.7' The author's right to integrity to
visual work, book, magazine, newspaper, periodical, data

base, electronic information service, electronic publication,
or similar publication;
(ii) any merchandising item or advertising, promotional,
descriptive, covering, or packaging material or container;
(3) any work made for hire; or
(C) any work not subject to copyright protection under this
title.
Id.
66. See supranotes 24-25 and accompanying text.
67. Damich, supranote 11, at 954. But see comments of Representative Fish,
supranote 63.
68. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(1) & (2) (1994).
69. One problem that arises when a work of art is incorporated into a building
is that removal of the art work from the building may mutilate or even destroy the
work.
70. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(1)(A) & (3) provides:
In a case in which -(A) a work of visual art has been incorporated in or made

part of a building in such a way that removing the work
from the building will cause the destruction, distortion,
mutilation, or other modification of the work as described
in section 106A(a)(3), and
(3) the author consented to the installation of the work in
the building either before the effective date set forth in

section 610(a) of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, or
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss2/3

14

Fielkow: Clashing Rights Under United States Copyright Law: Harmonizing an

1997]

MORAL RIGHTS INA WORK FOR HIRE

232

prevent such removal will not survive if she consented to the
installation. The second situation concerns works which can be
removed without distortion, mutilation, other modification, and
destruction.71 In this situation the author must assert her right to
integrity before her VARA right is implicated.
3. IndividualsProtected
When one thinks of a sculpture, painting or drawing one thinks of
its creator as an "artist." VARA, however, for the purpose of
consistency with the Copyright Act, limits moral rights protection to
"authors." An author under the 1976 Copyright Act (which VARA
is amended to) is an individual, or entity, who is entitled to claim
copyright ownership in a work.72
The term author as applied to moral rights can become problematic
in a written instrument executed on or after such effective
date that is signed by the owner of the building and the
author and that specifies that installation of the work may
subject the work to destruction, distortion, mutilation, or
other modification, by reason of its removal,
then the rights conferred by paragraphs (2) and (3) of section
106A(a) shall not apply.
Id; see MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, §
8D.06(c)(3), at 8D-79-80 (1996).
71. 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(2)(A) & (B) provides:
(2) If the owner of a building wishes to remove a work of visual
art which is a part of such building and such can be removed
from the building without the destruction, distortion, mutilation,
or other modification of the work as described in section
106A(a)(3), the author's rights under paragraphs (2) and (3)
shall apply unless --

(A) the owner has made a diligent, good faith attempt
without success to notify the author of the owner's intended
action affecting the work of visual art, or
(B) the owner did provide such notice in writing and the
person so notified failed, within 90 days after receiving such
notice, either to remove the work or pay for its removal.
Id.; NIMMER, supra note 70, at 8D-79-80.
72. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994). Copyright protection is vested in works of
authorship that are original and fixed.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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since the Copyright Act interprets "author" to include employers.73
An employer is deemed an author of a work made for hire, and thus
has copyright ownership in such works incident to employment.
Despite the employer's "economic" rights in copyright, most
employers cannot claim moral rights in a work if they did not
physically create it. Moral rights can only apply to one whose
"personality" was embodied in the art during its creation. In this
case, moral rights should vest in the employee who physically
created, and often originated and designed, the work. Thus, a
problem arises when an employer of a work made for hire owns the
copyright in a work and the employee-creator possesses moral rights
to her work.
VARA does not address this problem between employers and
employees and their respective rights. VARA simply excludes work
made for hire from its ambit of protection, thereby extinguishing any
moral rights the employee-creator possessed.74 More simply stated,
moral rights in a work made for hire do not exist for either party
under VARA.
VARA's exclusion of works for hire from moral rights protection
is inconsistent with moral rights theory because these rights exist
independently from the economic rights of a work.7" Despite this
inconsistency, the Berne Convention accommodates member
countries who recognize the work for hire concept. The Berne
Convention allows member countries to make their own rules on the
subject of authorship, therefore permitting a corporation or other
hiring party authorship status.76 Therefore, while U.S. law is not
inconsistent with Berne Convention by recognizing works made for
hire, VARA is inharmonious with moral rights theory. VARA does
73. 17 U.S.C. § 101. See infra notes 78-80 for discussion of the work for hire
concept.

74. See infranotes 78-80 and accompanying text.
75. Article 6bis states that an author keeps her moral rights even after she
transfers her economic rights. Berne Convention, supra note 15, at 27-6; see
Damich, supra note 11, at 965 n.95 (noting that French moral rights law does not
recognize the concept of work for hire except for computer programs). Even so,
a computer programmer under French law still retains her moral rights. Damich,
supra note 11, at 965 n. 95.
76. GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION, supra note 19, at 93.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss2/3
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not recognize the personal moral rights in an employee-artist of a
work made for hire while moral rights theory recognizes an artist's
moral rights even after she transfers her economic rights.
Therefore, an artist's status as an independent contractor, as
opposed to an employee, under a work made for hire determination
is crucial to recognizing and protecting her moral rights under
VARA. One commentator has noted that VARA's failure to protect
moral rights in this situation stems from the policy of awarding
control of the creative process to the "one who is bearing the financial
risk" of the work.77 The next section gives an overview of the
statutory basis for works made for hire and the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the factors relevant to defining an employment
relationship.
1i. WORK MADE FOR HimE

A work made for hire is created for an employer or other person
who commissioned such work. For purposes of the Copyright Act,
this employer or individual who commissioned the work is
considered the "author" and entitled to the economic benefits from
the exploitation of the copyrightable work.78 While the legislative
77. Damich, supranote 11, at 988.
78. The Copyright Act defines works made for hire:
Works Made For Hire- In the case of a work made for hire, the
employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is
considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the
parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument
signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the
copyright.
17 U.S.C. § 201 (b) (1994). The constitutionality of the work for hire concept has
been defended as consistent with the policy behind the copyright protection. See
Anne Marie Hill, Note, The "Work for Hire" Definition in the Copyright Act of
1976: Conflict Over Specially Orderedor Commissioned Works, 74 CORNELL
L.REV. 559, 579 (1989) (noting "[b]ecause the work for hire employer conceives
of the project, instructs the employee, participates actively and regularly in its
production, and assumes the financial risks, it is fair to consider the employer the
'author' for copyright purposes").
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and statutory history provide a basic structure,79 the work for hire
concept has been substantially developed in the courts. 0 The 1989
United States Supreme Court decision in Community for Creative
Non-Violence v. Reid81 was an attempt to shape the work for hire
provision into a more defined concept for determining copyright
79. The work made for hire provision of the 1976 Copyright Act is split
between employees and independent contractors of commissioned works. 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1994). The statute provides:.
A "work made for hire" is
(1) A work prepared by an employee within the scope
of his or her employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use
as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a
motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a
translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation,
as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for
a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a
written instrument signed by them that the work shall
be considered a work made for hire.
Id.
80. The work made for hire provision did not define the terms "employee" and
"scope of employment." The lower courts were therefore left to grapple with
interpretation of those terms, producing inconsistencies among the circuits. One
interpretation of employer relationship under the work made for hire provision was
the right to control test. See, e.g., Peregrine v. Lauren Corp., 601 F. Supp. 828
(D.Colo. 1985) (focusing on the controlthe hiring party maintained over the work).
A second test was developed in Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir.
1989), where the Ninth Circuit held that only formal, salaried employees should be
considered an employee under the 1976 Act. A third approach, looking to the
actual control of the hiring party over the hired party, received the most acceptance.
This approach was adopted by the Second, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits. See,
Brunswick Beacon v. Schoch-Hopchas Publishing Co., 810 F.2d 410 (4th Cir.
1987); Evans Newton, Inc. v. Chicago Systems Software, 793 F.2d 889 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied,479 U.S. 949 (1986); Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, 738 F.2d 548
(2d Cir.), cert.denied,469 U.S. 982 (1984). The fourth test was developed by the
Fifth Circuit in EasterSeal Society for CrippledChildren andAdults ofLouisiana,
Inc. v. Playboy Enterprises,815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987). This test employed
agency principles to first interpret whether the hired party was an employee or
independent contractor. Id, at 335. These four interpretations resulted in
inconsistent copyright protection for works made for hire.
81. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss2/3

18

Fielkow: Clashing Rights Under United States Copyright Law: Harmonizing an

1997]

MORAL RIGHTS RN A WORK FOR HIRE

236

ownership.82
Reid involved a dispute between the hiring party, CCNV, and the
artist-hired party, Reid, over copyright ownership and control over a
3
sculpture produced for a 1985 holiday pageant in Washington D.C.1
The sculpture, titled "Third World America," was a compilation of
ideas and materials from CCNV and Reid, although it was
exclusively created and produced by Reid. 4 After "Third World
America" was displayed for a month it was returned to the artist for
repairs." CCNV began to make plans to take the work on a several
city tour to raise money for the homeless. Reid objected to the tour
based on the inevitable damage a tour would cause the work. Based
on his objection, Reid refused to return the work.
In March of 1986 both parties filed competing copyright
registrations for "Third World America." CCNV then commenced an
action for return of the work and for determination of copyright
ownership.86 The district court determined that CCNV was the owner
of the copyright, declaring that the display was a work made for hire
under section 101 of the 1976 Act.87 The United States Court of
82. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflicting tests the
circuits were applying to determine work made for hire status. See supra note 80

for the conflicting tests. The Court recognized the implications of classifying a
work as made for hire and, therefore, was specifically interested in settling the
dispute over the term "employee" within the meaning of the statute. Reid, 490 U.S.
at 736-37.
83. The hiring party, Community of Creative Non-Violence (CCNV), "hired"
Baltimore artist, James Earle Reid, to sculpt figures for a modem Nativity display.
Reid, 490 U.S. at 733. This display focused on a contemporary homeless family
huddled around a street grate to keep warm. Reid donated his services so all
CCNV funds were dedicated for materials and payment of assistants. Id Copyright
ownership was never discussed before the dispute arose.
84. Reid worked on the statue through November and part of December 1985.
Id. at 734. CCNV members visited Reid at his studio several times to check his
progress and to coordinate CCNV's construction of the pedestal for the figures.
Reid incorporated most of CCNV's suggestions and complied with its directions
on the display's appearance. Id.
85. Reid, 490 U.S. at 735.
86. Id.

87. The court reasoned that Reid was an "employee" because CCNV had
conceived of the idea for "Third World America," was the motivating force in its
production, and had directed Reid's efforts in its construction. Id. at 735-36.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed this finding,
holding that the sculpture was not a work made for hire because Reid
was an independent contractor, not an employee under agency law.88
The United States Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeal's
work made for hire approach and subsequently affirmed.
Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous court, reviewed the four
interpretations of the term "employee."89 Upon rejecting three of the
tests, the Court adopted the approach of the Fifth and D.C. Circuits:
the agency law approach?0 The Court felt that the agency principles
would "enhance predictability" of copyright ownership.91 The Court
listed the factors used to determine employee status. These factors,
not one of which was to be determinative alone, have become known
as the "Reid Factors:" the hiring party's right to control the manner
and means by which the work is produced; the skill required to
accomplish the work; the source, or owner, of the tools and
instrumentalities used to produce the work; the location of the work;
the duration of the relationship between the parties; the right of the
hiring party to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent
of the discretion the hired party has over when and how long she
works; the method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and
paying assistants; whether the work is part of regular business of the
hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of
employee benefits; and, the tax treatment of the hired party.92
88. Reid, 490 U.S. at 736. The court adopted the "literal interpretation" of the
Fifth Circuit in EasterSeals. This approach applied agency principles to determine
a hired party's status. See supranote 80.
89. The four tests were the right to control the product test, the actual control
test, the formal, salaried employee test, and the agency law approach. See supra
note 80. CCNV advocated the right to control test and the actual control test as the
proper approaches for determining Reid's status as an employee. The Court,
however, rejected these tests as inconsistent with the language and structure of
section 101. Reid,490 U.S. at 741-43. The Court also rejected the position of Reid
and various amici for a formal, salaried employee test. Id. at 742 n.8.
90. The Court found support for this approach in the language of the statute and
its legislative history. Reid, 490 U.S. at 744-48.
91. Id. at 749.
92. Id. at 751-752. The Supreme Court applied the agency factors to the
relationship between CCNV and Reid and came to the same conclusion as the
Court of Appeals: Reid was an independent contractor, not an employee under
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss2/3
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Although the Supreme Court intended its Reid Factors to resolve
the various interpretations of an "employee" in the work made for
hire determination, it is evident that circuit courts have once again
modified, or re-prioritized, the elements in considering a work for
hire to determine copyright ownership. For example, the Second
Circuit defined a "weighted" Reid Factor approach in its 1992
decision in Aymes v. Bonelli.93 The court listed five Reid Factors it
deemed most "significant" in almost every work for hire case.94 It
agency principles. Reid,490 U.S. at 752-53. The Court found that although CCNV
directed some of Reid's work, the other factors weighed heavily for finding an
independent contractor. Even though the Court determined that Reid was an
independent contractor, it was not clear whether Reid and CCNV could be
considered joint authors. It remanded for further determination. See Community
for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, CIV.A.No. 86-1507(TPJ), 1991 WL 415523
(D.D.C. Jan. 7, 1991), for the district court's consent judgment on the ownership
resolution.
93. 980 F.2d (2d Cir. 1992). The facts of the case were as follows: Clifford
Scott Aymes was hired as a computer programmer by Jonathan Bonelli, doing
business as Island Recreational (a chain of swimming pool stores). Id. at 858.
During the period he worked for Bonelli, Aymes created a series of computer
programs that were used to maintain a variety of records. There Was no agreement
concerning copyright ownership, although Aymes asserted that Bonelli had orally
promised him that the program would only be used at one computer, in one Island
office. Id Aymes left Island after two years when his hours were cut. Id. at 859.
He subsequently registered the program in his own name at the Copyright Office
and sued Bonelli and Island for copyright infringement for its later use of the
program at multiple sites. Id.
The district court found that Aymes was an employee of Bonelli and that the
programs were therefore works made for hire, granting copyright ownership to
Bonelli and Island. Id The Second Circuit reversed the district court, finding the
misapplication of the Reid Factors as mandating a more structured approach.
94. Id. at 861. The court justified its approach by noting that because Reid's
discretionary factors gave "no direction" for deciding how to balance the factors,
a weighted approach would give more structure to the Reid Factors. Id It listed the
five significant factors in almost any cases as:
(1) the hiring party's right to control the manner and means of
creation; (2) the skill required; (3) the provision of employee
benefits; (4) the tax treatment of the hired party; and (5) whether
the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the
hired party.
Id. The court stated that these factors were more important than the other Reid
Factors because the five "will usually be highly probative of the true nature of the
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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stated that although these five factors should "be given more weight"
in determining an employment relationship, an analysis may also
include a review of other Reid Factors only if such factors
demonstrate importance to the facts ofthe case. 95 The court discarded
the remaining Reid Factors that had little significance to the facts, as
indeterminate or irrelevant, noting other circuits' adoption of some
variety of the weighted approach. 96
Another example of the lack of stability inherent in the Reid
Factors is found in some circuit courts' treatment of their lower
courts' findings of fact.97 An application of the Reid Factors to any
particular situation necessarily involves many specific fact
determinations by the district court. Although appellate courts
normally give deference to a district court's finding of facts, several
appellate courts have tended to do their own fresh fact finding in the
work made for hire context. 9 The appellate courts' "de novo" review
employment relationship." Id.
The Second Circuit applied the five factors to the facts and concluded that
Aymes was an independent contractor under its approach. It found that Aymes'
high level of skill as a computer programmer, the absence of employee benefits,
and his tax treatment by Island were indicative of an independent contractor. Id.
at
862-63. Although the court found that Bonelli retained the right to control the
work and assign Aymes other projects, it concluded that these factors were
outweighed by the other three.
95. Id at 864 (noting that "[t]he other factors were either indeterminate, because
they were evenly balanced between the parties, or of marginal significance, because
they were inapplicable to these facts"). The court nevertheless reviewed the
remaining Reid Factors to demonstrate why they were relatively insignificant.
96. Id. at 861 (noting that "[a]lthough the Reid test has not yet received
widespread application, other courts that have interpreted the test have in effect
adopted this weighted approach by only addressing those factors found to be
significant in the individual case"). The court then cited cases from the Third and
Eleventh Circuits and various district courts which supported a pick-and-choosethe-factors approach advocated by the Second Circuit.
97. David Goldberg and Robert J. Bernstein, Revisiting the Facts in Work-For-

Hire Cases, N.Y. L.J., January 19, 1996 (finding "appellate review of a district
court's factual findings on the issue [of work made for hire under Reid] seems
increasingly less deferential than in other contexts").
98. Id.The Second Circuit has developed somewhat of a reputation for
revisiting the facts in a Reid Factor analysis. In Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857 (2d
Cir. 1992), the Second Circuit reversed the district court's finding of an
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss2/3
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of the facts under the work for hire factors is evidence that the Reid
Factors can be molded and shaped to reach a desired conclusion,
despite the existence of facts which also support a contrary outcome.
The Reid Factors do not render a consistent or predictable result
due to the highly factual nature of the determination and the conflict
between the circuit and district courts to pinpoint the relevant factors.
This unpredictability has become more problematic since work for
hire status is now relevant beyond the copyright ownership question.
The passing of VARA, one year after the Reid decision, introduced
moral rights which can be profoundly impacted by the Reid Factors.
Because moral rights can often hinge on a court's determination of
the artist's status as an employee or independent contractor, a
predictable and balanced work for hire test is crucial. Beyond the
discretionary nature of the Reid Factors is an underlying problem of
current U.S. copyright law. The "clash" of the work for hire doctrine
and moral rights theory can result in competing interests between the
employer's economic right in the visual art work and the employeecreator's moral rights. Under current U.S. copyright law, this clash
extinguishes the artist's moral rights. The next section illustrates this
clash and its impact on irreplaceable works of art.

employment relationship through its five factor analysis. See supra notes 93-96 and
accompanying text. In Playboy Enterprises,Inc. v. Dumas, 53 F.3d 549 (2d Cir.
1995), the Second Circuit reversed the district court's finding of an independent
contractor status and remanded for further consideration, rejecting its fact finding
and application of the Reid Factors. Finally, Carterv. Helmsley-Spear, 71 F.3d 77
(2d Cir. 1995), stands as the most blatant example of the Second Circuit's
willingness to make its own fact determination contrary to that of the district court.
See infra notes 99-149 and accompanying text for discussion of the Carter

decision.
The Sixth Circuit has also lowered the clearly erroneous threshold to review the

facts for itself when there is a work for hire issue. For example, in Hi-Tech Video
ProductionsInc. v. CapitalCities/ABC Inc., 58 F.3d 1093 (6th Cir. 1995), the Sixth
Circuit reversed a lower court finding of an employee relationship, citing errors in
the factual findings of several Reid Factors. See infra notes 170-176 and
accompanying text for further discussion of Hi-Tech Video.
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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III. CLASH ILLUSTRATED: CARTER v HELMSLEY-SPEAR, INC. 99

An artist who needs to preserve the physical integrity of her work
from some impending modification 00 or destruction 1 by another
may assert her moral rights to protect her work. However, merely
"asserting" one's moral rights will not automatically protect the art
work. An artist must clear a number of "hurdles" before the courts
will permanently enjoin another from modifying or destroying the
artist's work."0 2 One of the most difficult hurdles an artist must clear
can be proving that she is an independent contractor, and not an
employee under the work made for hire determination. A court's
interpretation of the discretionary Reid Factors as applied to a moral
rights determination may forfeit the necessary moral rights to save the
artwork. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc. represents how this
discretionary test will produce inconsistent results for recognizing
99. 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1824 (1996).
100. Modification of an art work includes distortion and modification, as
covered under VARA. See supra notes 49-51 for discussion on rights against
distortion, mutilation and other modification.
101. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
102. This author describes the requisite VARA elements necessary to make out

a federal moral rights claim as "hurdles." This term is use to illustrate the difficulty
an artist faces when she attempts to claim her moral rights in her work. A brief
description of the "hurdles" is useful.
A threshold question, or first hurdle, is inquiring whether the artist previously
waived her moral rights. The waiver, however, must be a clear, written release of
the artist's moral rights to the specific work at issue. See supra note 61.
Another hurdle is whether the work at issue falls within the definition of visual
art. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text. Of course, even if the work is
a limited edition painting, for example, its status as a visual art work further
depends on whether it falls into one of the exceptions to visual art. See supra note
65 (listing such exceptions to the visual art classification as useful articles, applied
art, motion pictures, charts, books, advertising items or any works made for hire).
In the case of a modification (including mutilations and distortions) the artist
must further prove that such modification would prejudice her honor or reputation.
See supranotes 50-51 and accompanying text. On the other hand, in the case of
destruction, the artist must prove that her work is of recognized stature to receive
protection. See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text. Finally, the death of the
artist will extinguish any moral rights claim by her heirs or assigns. See supranote
39 and accompanying text.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss2/3
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moral rights.
A. Background
Plaintiffs John Meade Swing, John James Veronis, Jr. and John
Francis Carter, three partners known as the "ThreeJs" or "Jx3"
(hereinafter "artists" or "ThreeJs"), are professional sculptors who
Work together to create sculptures and other artwork. 10 3 On
December 16, 1991, the three artists entered into a one year contract
with the net lessee (the defendant's predecessor) of a large
commercial building at 47-44 31 st Street in Queens, New York, to
design and install sculptures and permanent installations in the lobby
area (hereinafter referred to as the "Work"). The contract gave the
artists "full authority in design, color and style," and the managing
agent of the building retained some authority to direct the location
and installation of the Work on the property's premises." 4 The artists
also retained the copyrights in the Work with any proceeds from the
exploitation of the copyright split equally between the artists and the
managing agent. The artists were each paid $1000 weekly pursuant
to the contract, with no set date for completion of the Work. In fact,
on January 20, 1993, the parties executed an agreement extending the
duration of their relationship for an additional year.
The Work was described by the court as "a very large 'walkthrough sculpture' occupying most, but not all, of the building's
lobby."' 5 The theme of the Work focused on environmental
concerns by utilizing recycled material in an interrelated manner.
The variety of sculptural elements in the football-field sized work
consisted primarily of metal affixed to the walls and ceilings. Among
other things, the Work included a giant hand made from an old school
bus, a face made from car parts and other interactive components.
The Work also included a vast mosaic made from recycled glass
which was embedded into the floors and walls.106
103. Carter,71 F.3d at 80.
104. Id
105. Id
106. Id. The interrelated nature of the sculptural components played off one
another. The District Court opinion described one portion of the Work which
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The Work was about seventy-five percent complete, when in April
1994, the lessees of the building became insolvent and filed for
bankruptcy. It was at this time that defendant Helmsley-Spear
became the managing agent for the building and subsequently ordered
the artists to leave the premises and not return. Helmsley-Spear also
made statements indicating that the Work would be removed or
materially altered. 7 The artists filed suit under VARA to prevent the
mutilation and inevitable destruction of the lobby sculpture.
B. DistrictCourtDetermination08
The district court began its work made for hire analysis with a
quick review of the statutory provisions and the Reid Factors. The
court noted the five relevant Reid Factors as identified by the Second
Circuit in Aymes v. BonelliJ0 9 Although this 1992 case established
five Reid Factors relevant to almost any case, the court recognized
that all of the Reid Factors must be given weight according to the
facts in a given case. The five factors recognized were: "the right to
control the manner and means of production; requisite skill; provision
of employee benefits; tax treatment of the hired party; whether the
contained a floor and ceiling mosaic depicting a dollar bill: "The images on the
front and back of a dollar bill, the text of the mosaic, and related sculptural
elements, together depict the destruction of the world's oceans as a result of man's
greed." Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 228, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).

107. Removal of the Work from the lobby would have resulted in its
destruction. Carter,71 F.3d at 83.
108. The district court initially granted the artists a temporary restraining order
to prevent Helmsley-Spear from altering or modifying the installation until the
outcome of the case. Carter v. Helnsley-Spear, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y.
1994). Because the artists had not previously waived their moral rights (or their
copyrights, for that matter), and the District Court was easily persuaded both that
prejudice to the artists' honor or reputation would result from modification and that
the Work was of "recognized stature," the bulk of the court's opinion was devoted
to determining whether the Work was a work made for hire. Carter v. HelmsleySpear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 316-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
109. 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992); see supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text
(discussing the Second Circuit's decision inAymes as one example of how the Reid
Factors have taken a shape of their own in the various circuits).
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The court
hired party may be assigned additional projects." '
focused its Reid Factor analysis on these five issues.
The district court first found that the artists had complete control
over the manner and means in producing the Work. 1 The district
court further noted that the artists also had complete artistic freedom
in designing and installing the Work. 12 The court thus found the
artists' freedom to create a strong factor in support of independent
contractor status.
The second factor concerned the level of skill required to create the
Work.1 I The court noted that the "ThreeJs," as artists and sculptors,
were highly skilled professionals. The court found that the entire
creation process "clearly required great skill" and, accordingly,
114
weighted this factor in favor of an independent contractor status.
The court merged the next two factors together in its analysis. The
provision of benefits to, and the tax treatment of, the artists tended,
in the district court's view, to favor the defendant's contention that
the artists were employees. 5 The district court found it undisputed
that the managing agent had provided the artists with health and
insurance benefits and that taxes had been withheld from the artists'
payments. 1 6 The court noted that although the managing agent had
provided benefits, these provisions were cut in December, 1993, and
17
the artists had continued to work without them.
The fifth factor, and final one under the Second Circuit Aymes
110. Carter,861 F. Supp. at 317.
111. Id. at 317-318 (finding that "the record demonstrates that plaintiffs had
virtually unfettered discretion in creating the Work"). The court pointed out that
under the terms of the contract, the artists retained "full authority in design, color
and style." Id.at 317.
112. Carter,861 F. Supp. at 317 (noting that the artists "understood that they
were commissioned to design a lobby that would be a 'museum' of their original

art").
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id
Id at318.
Id at 318-319.
Id. at318.
Id. Based on the cutting of benefits, the court seemed to weigh only the

tax treatment as favoring the defendants: "This factor [benefits] is not
determinative [of employee status] especially in light of the fact that plaintiffs
continued to work on the Work once the provision of benefits had ceased." Id.
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approach, was the right to assign additional projects.118 Based on the
contract and supporting testimony, the district court found that the
artists were hired to perform a specific task, to install art on the
property. The contract provided for the artists to design and install
the sculpture on the property and to perform other "related services
and duties" as assigned from time to time." 9 The district court found
that this provision supported the contention that the artists "were
hired solely to install art on the property" and that a few additional
tasks that the artists did perform on the property did not undermine
this position120
The court noted that although the facts supported a finding for
independent contractor status under the Aymes approach, it would
also consider the remaining Reid Factors to further examine the
issue.12 ' In the court's view, these other factors also supported its
22
initial finding for independent contractor status.
118. Carter,861 F. Supp. at 319 (highlighting that "independent contractors are
typically hired only for particular projects.") (citing Aymes, 980 F.2d at 863).
119. Carter,861 F. Supp. at 319.
120. The district court noted that although the artists did install artwork in other
areas of the property, that on one occasion the artists refused to undertake an
assignment in another building. Id. at 319. The fact that the artists were not
penalized or fired for their refusal supported the district court's finding that the
defendants never viewed the artists as employees who could be assigned additional
work. Id
121. Id. at 319-21. The court listed the remaining Reid Factors:
(1) the source of the instrumentalities and tools; (2) the location
of the work; (3) the duration of the relationship between the
parties; (4) the extent of the hired party's discretion over when
and how long to work; (5) the method of payment; (6) the hired
party's role in hiring and paying assistants; (7) whether the work
is part of the regular business of the hiring party; and (8)
whether the hiring party is in business.
Id. at 319.
122. The court found four of the eight remaining Reid Factors relevant to
determining whether the Work was a work for hire. The court found the duration
of the relationship between the artists and the defendant supported the artists'
contention that they were independent contractors. Id at 320. Another factor found
by the court to favor the artist's position was the extent of the discretion the artist
had over their hours to work. Id The court also determined that the Work was not
the type of work created in the regular course of the defendant's business. Id. at
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss2/3
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Beyond its finding of independent contractor status under the
Aymes approach and remaining Reid Factors, the district court
considered an additional factor which bolstered its conclusion. The
district court additionally relied on the artists' copyright ownership
in the work, as provided for in the contract, as a "plus factor" in
finding the artists were independent contractors. 23 The district court
found this factor helpful in ascertaining how the parties viewed their
own relationship before the litigation ensued. 124 It noted that
employers usually contemplate the creation of copyrightable material
for its benefit.12 The fact that the defendant did not reserve this right
may have indicated its assessment of the relationship as a hiring party
of a commissioned work.
Based on these findings, the court concluded that the Work was not
a work made for hire and, thus, covered by VARA. The court
therefore granted the artists a permanent injunction prohibiting
Helmsley-Spear from modifying or removing the Work for the
26
lifetimes of the artists.
C. Second CircuitReview
The Second Circuit reviewed the facts in light of the relevant Reid
Factors (as supplied under Aymes) and subsequently arrived at a
contrary conclusion from that of the district court. In the Second
Circuit's judgment, the factors weighed more heavily for a finding of
an employer/employee relationship and, therefore, the Work was a
work made for hire.
321. It accordingly found these factors to weigh in favor of the artists. Although
the court found that the method of payment, weekly checks to each artist, tended
to support the defendant's contention that the artists were employees, it concluded
that the Aymes approach and the remaining Reid Factors ultimately favored a
finding of independent contractor status.
123. Carter,861 F. Supp. at 321-22.
124. Id at 322.
125. Id. at 321.
126. Id at 322. The court did, however, dismiss the artists' claims for tortious
interference, award of costs and attorney's fees, and also refused their request to
complete the lobby artwork. The court also dismissed Heimsley-Spear's
counterclaim for waste. Both sides appealed.
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The Second Circuit began its review of the case with the history
and development of moral rights under VARA. 27 The court reviewed
VARA's provisions for the right to attribution and integrity. The
court pointed out that the right to integrity gives the author the right
to prevent deforming or mutilating changes to her work even after she
has parted with the economic rights. The court further recognized
that the right of integrity includes the right to prevent destruction of
the artwork.1 21 The court noted that the perception of the purpose of
moral rights reflects whether or not the integrity right protects a work
129
of art from destruction.
The court reviewed the section 101 definition of a work made for
hire and listed the Reid Factors used in the employee/independent
contractor analysis. The court noted its normal reluctance to overturn
a district court's factual findings in determining the presence or
absence of the Reid Factors. 3 It also highlighted the "ease" with
31
which the Reid test could be misapplied.
127. Carter,71 F.3d at 81-3.
128. Id. at 81-2. The court stated that "[i]n some jurisdictions" the right of
integrity protects art work from destruction. The reference to jurisdictions includes
the United States, as well as most member countries adhering to Berne Convention.
As previously explored in note 60 and text, Article 6his of Berne Convention does
not explicitly prohibit destruction under moral rights. However, destruction could
be covered under Article 6bis "derogatory action." The court's reference to "some
jurisdictions" seems odd since the right against destruction is clearly proscribed in
VARA. See supranote 52. The language in the opinion tends to lead a reader to
conclude that the U.S. is distinct from, rather than included in, the jurisdictions
prohibiting destruction of irreplaceable works of art.
129. Carter,71 F.3d at 81-2. Judge Cardamone, author of the Second Circuit
opinion, framed the purposes as follows:
If integrity is meant to stress the public interest in preserving a
nation's culture, destruction is prohibited; ifthe right is meant to
emphasized the author's personality, destruction is seen as less
harmful than the continued display of deformed or mutilated
work that misrepresents the artist and destruction may proceed.
Id (citations omitted).
130. Id at 85. An appellate court's review of a district court's findings of fact
is the clearly erroneous standard. A legal conclusion is reviewed de novo.
131. Id. This language tends to show the Second Circuit's view of its role in a
Reid Factor review. Its almost as though the court assumed a duty to undertake its
own factual finding of each factor to prevent this "misapplication." See supra notes
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss2/3
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The court found overwhelming evidence to support the artists'
contention that they controlled almost all aspects of the sculpture's
creation.13 2 The court agreed with the district court that the artists
retained "complete artistic freedom" even though the artists accepted
suggestions from building agents on various aspects of the
sculpture.133 Although the court found the right to control factor "lent
credence" to the artists' contentions that they were independent
contractors, it noted that one factor is not dispositive in the inquiry.
The Second Circuit also agreed with the district court that the
artists' performance of the work required great skill in creation and
execution. 134 It was undisputed that each artist was recognized as a
"professional" and that sculpting is a highly skilled profession. This
factor also weighed against a finding of a work for hire.
The employee benefits and tax treatment, the third and fourth
factors, were found to weigh in favor of finding an employee status,
just as the district court had found.135 The district court, however, did
not give these factors as much weight because the defendants had
ceased providing benefits at the end of 1993 and the artists
subsequently continued to work without benefits.' 36 The court of
appeals did not recognize the discontinuance of benefits as affecting
the outcome of these two factors. It137found these two factors also
favored a finding of employee status.
The right to assign additional projects was the last factor under the
Aymes approach. The court found, contrary to the district court's
finding, that the defendant had the right and did assign additional
projects to the artists. The court disagreed with the district court that
just because the few other tasks the artists did perform were art
97-98 and accompanying text for examples of the circuit courts' review of district
courts' factual findings.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. See Carter,861 F. Supp. at 318 for discussion of the district court's
analysis of the second factor.
135. Carter,71 F.3d at 86. See Carter,861 F. Supp. at 318-19 for the district
court's discussion of these issues.
136. Carter,861 F. Supp. at 319.
137. Carter,71 F.3d at 86.
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related that it was not an "additional project." 3 ' The Second Circuit
emphasized that the artists were primarily hired to create the lobby
sculpture and any additional projects assigned supported a conclusion
of an employee role. 139

The Second Circuit viewed the fact that the artists had completed
three additional projects on the property without objection as
conclusive of employee status. The court therefore found the district
court's determination of this factor clearly erroneous. It determined
that the defendant's ability to assign additional projects weighed in
favor of finding a work for hire. 40
After reviewing the five factors under the Aymes approach, the
court briefly listed a few other Reid Factors which were indicia of an
employment relationship. While the district court had found four of
the remaining eight Reid Factors helpful in its assessment of the
artists' status, the Second Circuit only discussed three factors, two of
which were previously determined by the district court to be
"inconclusive." 141 The court found that the defendant provided many
supplies used to create the work. 142 The court also determined that
since the artists had to seek payment from the defendant for its paid
assistants, that this factor also favored finding an employment
relationship. 43 The Second Circuit further disagreed with the district
138. See Carter,861 F. Supp. at 319 for district court's application of the final
factor.
139. Carter,71 F.3d at 86. The court found that "performance of other
assigned work not of the artists' choosing supports a conclusion that the artists
were not independent contractors ....

"

Id.

140. Id.
141. See Carter,861 F. Supp. at 319-22 for the district court's review of the
inconclusive factors.
142. The source of tools and instrumentalities factor was considered
inconclusive by the district court because it found that both the artists and
defendants had provided the materials for the Work. Carter,861 F. Supp. at 320.
The Second Circuit did not provided any facts to support its assertion that the
defendant provided many supplies, implying that the artists contributed nothing.
143. The district court had found the right to hire assistants factor inconclusive
in this case. Carter,861 F. Supp. at 320-21. The district court noted that the artists
were responsible for hiring all assistants, paid and unpaid, and the defendant was
responsible for compensating the paid assistants. Id. This splitting of the factor
rendered it neutral in the district court's view. The Second Circuit obviously
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss2/3
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court that the artists and defendant had a "finite term of
engagement." 1" The Second Circuit found that the artists worked on
the Work for a "substantial period of time," with no set date for
completion of the project.145 It thus concluded that these three factors
146
also supported an employee relationship.
The court of appeals made only a brief reference to the artists'
copyright ownership in the Work.
The court admitted its
uncertainty of whether copyright ownership was indeed a "plus
factor," as the district court found it to be, but declined to decide its
value. It decided to "put off for another day.., whether copyright
148
ownership is probative of independent contractor status.'
The court concluded that the assessment of the five relevant factors,
as well as a review of other applicable Reid Factors, provided more
than sufficient evidence that the artists were employees and that the
Work was therefore a work for hire. 149 In sum, this determination
removed the work from VARA's protective ambit, thereby forfeiting
the artists' right to prevent the destruction of their work.
IV. ANALYSIS
Carteris significant as the first VARA decision on the issue of
moral rights in a work for hire setting. The outcome of this decision
represents some of the weaknesses of VARA and some of the
shortcomings of the Reid Factors. This section analyzes the decision
disagreed with the district court's determination on this factor.
144. Carter,71 F.3d at 87. The district court termed the relationship as "finite"
because the relationship was to end with the completion of the Work. It found this
arrangement to characteristic of an independent contractor relationship. Carter,861
F. Supp. at 320.
145. Carter,71 F.3d at 87.
146. Id The Second Circuit did not address the three other Reid Factors that
the district court found relevant to the inquiry: the discretion the artists had over
their hours, the method of payment and whether the defendant created sculptures
as a regular course of business.
147. Carter,71 F.3d at 87.
148. Id The court also stated that even as a plus factor, copyright ownership
in this case would not alter the outcome of its determination. Id.
149. Id. at 87-88.
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rendered in Carter,the current problematic application of the Reid
Factors and the flaws in VARA itself.
A. Carterv. Helmsley-Spear: FlawedApplication Exposed
The Second Circuit decision in Carter exploited VARA's
weaknesses and molded the Reid Factors to render a judgment which
both stripped the artists of their moral rights and will deprive society
from viewing their irreplaceable art. An analysis of the district court
and Second Circuit opinions exposes this inequitable result.
Under the Aymes approach, the disputed factor in Carterappeared
to be the hiring party's right to assign additional projects.150 This
factor can be relevant since "independent contractors are typically
hired for only particular projects.. 15 Thus, as the district court
explained, "when a hired party is hired to participate in numerous
unspecified chores" as directed by the hiring party, then the hired
party is usually an employee; on the other hand, "when a hired party
is hired to complete or achieve a specific task," it is probable that that
party is an independent contractor. 152
The district court found that the artists were hired to perform a
specific task: to install art on the property.'53 The district court
further noted that the artists were not reprimanded for refusing to
perform an assignment at a different property.' 54 The Second Circuit,
on the other hand, failed to mention the artists' refusal and instead
150. Both the district court and the Second Circuit had agreed that the artists'
had complete control over the production of the Work and that the artists were
highly skilled. Both courts also agreed that the employee benefits and tax
treatment of the artists were characteristic of an employment relationship. The
courts diverged on how much weight to accord these last two factors.
151. Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857, 863 (2d Cir. 1992).
152. Carter,861 F. Supp. at 319.

153. Id. The district court based its decision on the contract and supporting
testimony. The contract provided that the artists were to install the Lobby Work
and other permanent installations on the property.
154. Id.The district court also noted that one of the artists was a licensed
structural steel welder and that he was never asked to use his welding skills other
than to complete the Work. This further supported the district court's position that
the artists' were hired to install art work on the property and not to perform
unrelated tasks.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss2/3
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focused on the fact that the artists had performed three other art
related tasks in the building. It apparently concluded that installation
of art in the building was not a single project but rather constituted
unspecified tasks.
The disparity in outcomes on this factor appears to revolve around
the interpretation of "project."' 55 The district court did not view the
installation of art in various places on the property as separate tasks,
but rather as a part of a single project. On the other hand, the Second
Circuit used the completion of other art works as proof of employee
status. It is unclear which interpretation of "project" is correct based
on facts which support either interpretation. This factor may have
been better decided as "indeterminate" of whether the work was made
for hire.
Regardless of whether this factor favored the artists or not, given
the nature of the Work (several, interrelated sculptures united with a
consistent theme) and the conflicting views on what constituted a
"project," this factor should not have been afforded the "weight" it
received. Just because this factor was identified in Aymes as a
"significant" factor should not mean that the Second Circuit could not
have accorded this factor less weight. Even when the Second Circuit
applied this factor in Aymes, it found that the hiring party's right to
assign other projects "carrie[d] less weight" than the other four
factors.' 5 6 It gave this factor less weight in Aymes because even
though the hiring party assigned Aymes other projects in addition to
the creation of the computer program, this delegation of other tasks
was "not inconsistent with the idea that he [Aymes] was Island's
independent trouble shooter who might be asked to intervene as
computer problems arose."' '
The Second Circuit should have
applied similar logic to Carter. The artists' completion of other art
work on the property was not inconsistent with the theory that they
were art consultants who might be asked to continue their lobby
Work into other areas of the building to entice future tenants. Even
if the Second Circuit found this factor to favor the defendant, it
should have given it less weight than the other factors, just as it had
155. The Second Circuit failed to defined "project" for future cases.
156. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 863.

157. Id.
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done in Aymes.
While the court should have given the control factor less weight in
its analysis, it should have afforded greater weight to the exclusive
artistic control the artists had over the manner and means of
production. Since the Second Circuit was applying the Reid Factors
in a new setting (moral rights), it should have applied the factors with
an eye towards vindicating the purpose of VARA: protection of
personal moral rights. The fact that the artists had complete artistic
freedom strengthens their claim for moral rights since it was
exclusively their "personality" projected into the Work. Therefore,
a greater emphasis on the artistic freedom would, at the very least,
give consideration to protecting their personality embodied in the
15 8
art.
The employee benefit and tax treatment factors are also significant
to understand the Second Circuit's conclusion in Carter. Both courts
found that because the artists received benefits and had taxes withheld
from payments, that these two factors weighed in favor of employee
status. The district court gave the benefit factor less weight since the
artists continued their work without benefits when the defendant had
ceased providing them in December, 1993. The Second Circuit gave
this fact no consideration and found that these two factors clearly
favored a finding of employee status.
The disturbing element of the Second Circuit's disposition on these
two factors is not the conclusion (for it really was not disputed that
the artists received benefits and had money withheld for taxes), but
rather it was the heavy emphasis the court placed on these two
factors. It was as though the Second Circuit decided the artists' status
based exclusively on their benefits and tax treatment. This is
supported by two observations. First, the Second Circuit appears
predisposed to rely exclusively on these two factors based on
language in its Aymes decision. The court in its Aymes opinion stated
that "[t]he importance of these two factors is underscored by the fact
158. See infra note 178 and accompanying text for the suggested Reid approach
in a moral rights determination. The Second Circuit noted that "despite the
conclusion today we do not intend to marginalize facets such as artistic freedom
and skill" although these factors "will usually favor VARA protection." Carter,71
F.3d at 87.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol7/iss2/3
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that every case since Reid that has applied the test has found the hired
party to be an independent contractor where the hiring party failed to
extend benefits or pay social security taxes.""' 9 The Second Circuit
obviously decided to follow its own "rule of thumb" and find an
employment relationship based on a "formal" employment test. This
rule of thumb appears to be a convenient substitute for the Reid
Factors. However, the Supreme Court in Reid explicitly rejected a
formal, salaried approach. 6 ° The Second Circuit, realizing such a
rejection, therefore molded the remaining Reid Factors to reach its
desired outcome.
The second observation to bolster the contention that the Second
Circuit based its conclusion exclusively on the benefits and tax
treatment is the lack of articulated support for the other factors. For
example, the Second Circuit's treatment of the remaining Reid
Factors was haphazard and unsupported. The court only addressed
three of the remaining eight Reid Factors, two of which were
previously determined inconclusive by the district court.'61 The court
chose the facts it wanted to rely on, while completely failing to
address why facts the district court relied on were irrelevant to its
159. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 863 (citations omitted). The court supported its

assertion with citations from Third Circuit opinions and various district court
holdings.
160. Reid, 490 U.S. at 743 n.8.
161. The Second Circuit found three "other" Reid Factors to favor the
defendant: the defendant supplied many of the supplies; it provided payment for
paid assistants; and there was no finite term for completion of the Work. Carter,
71 F.3d at 86-7. The Second Circuit did not address the district court finding that
the artists used their own tools on the Work and had in fact invested thousands of
dollars in supplies for the Work. The Second Circuit also failed to discuss that the
artists had full responsibility and control over its assistants, even though they did
not directly pay the paid assistants. The Second Circuit also rested its decision on
its conclusion that the two year relationship was indicative of an employment
relationship, even though (as the district court pointed out) that the relationship
between the artists and the defendant was to terminate once the lobby Work was
complete. Id. at 87. Given the enormous size of the Work and the fact that the
lobby was a public area (thus limiting the hours in which the artists could install the
components), two years does not seem to be an unreasonable time frame for the
artists to install the Work.

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

37

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 3

255

DEPA UL J ART & ENT LAW

[Vol. VII:218

decision. 62 This failure to find additional substantive support for its
conclusion furthers the theory that the Second Circuit decided the
artists' fate on two of the twelve Reid Factors.
Perhaps the Second Circuit's most egregious error was its refusal
to consider the artists' copyright ownership as relevant to determining
the relationship. This refusal is indicative of a couple of issues. First,
the Second Circuit's failure to articulate why it "put off for another
day" to decide the relevance of copyright ownership further proves it
had reached its conclusion with the benefit and tax factors. Second,
the court completely missed the ironic relevance this factor had to the
case. All previous work for hire case law had been developed to
decide the very issue that was undisputed in Carter: copyright
ownership of a particular work.16 Thus, the clear delineation of
copyright ownership in Carter was given no weight in the moral
rights context, while the very case law the Second Circuit relied on
was developed to settle disputes over copyright ownership.' 64
Although copyright ownership should not be dispositive, it is
certainly highly relevant to the status of the relationship and,
therefore, deserved some consideration in Carter.
The impact of Carteris significant because it stands as the first
decision on VARA and will serve as basis for future moral rights
162. The Second Circuit neither conceded nor struck down two Reid Factors the
district court had found to support the artists: the discretion the artists had over
their hours and that the Work was not the type of work created in the regular course
of the defendant's business. This silence should be interpreted as supporting the
artists' position.
163. For example, in Reidthe issue was deciding who, employer or independent
contractor, owned the copyright in "Third World America." Reid, 490 U.S. at 753.
Aymes similarly involved a dispute over copyright ownership in a computer
program. Aymes, 980 F.2d at 863.
164. See Second CircuitHolds Sculpture to be Unprotected "Work For Hire",
109 Harv. L. Rev. 2110, 2113 (1996) (finding that the Second Circuit's failure to
consider the artists' copyright ownership in the Work as evidence of its
"fundamental misunderstanding ofthe difference between the function of the 'work
for hire' provision in disputes over copyright ownership and its function in an
assertion of moral rights under VARA"). It was further suggested that "the artists'
retention of copyright effectively obviated the inquiry into the Restatement factors
listed in Reid." Id. at 2114.
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determinations.' 65 The Second Circuit's heavy emphasis on the
employee benefits and tax treatment spells trouble for artists who
enjoy some security in the work that can be a sole means of support
for themselves and their families. This emphasis on these two factors
further perpetuates the idea that only a "starving artist" (who refuses
to waive her rights) will enjoy any moral rights protection.'
The decision also proves how malleable the Reid Factors have
become. While the Second Circuit's Aymes approach is an attempt
to give structure to the Reid Factors, its application only illustrates
the highly discretionary and unpredictable nature of a finding under
the work made for hire doctrine. The next section addresses these
shortcomings and suggests a more consistent approach to moral rights
theory.
B. Reid Factors: A "Tailored"Approach
The Reid Factors have been both praised and criticized since the
Supreme Court's ruling in 1989.167 On one hand, the Reid Factors did
165. The immediate impact of this decision is that the artists' irreplaceable work
can be destroyed at the will of the defendant. Not only does this deprive the public
from experiencing this "walk through sculpture," but it denies the artists the right
to preserve a piece of their personality.
166. The Second Circuit appeared to realize some of the impact of its holding.
It recognized that by using the existence of employment benefits against the artist
that it appeared "that the artists regrettably are being forced to choose between
personal benefits inuring in an employment relationship and VARA's protection
of the artists' work afforded only to independent contractors." Carter,71 F.3d at
87.
167. See, e.g., Alexandra Duran, Comment, Community For Creative NonViolence v. Reid: The Supreme Court Reduces Predictabilityby Attributing an
Agency Standardto the Work For Hire Doctrine of the 1976 Copyright Act, 56
BROOK. L. REv. 1081 (1990) (finding the agency law standard employed in Reid
"impractical" because its complicated nature will reduce predictability at the
beginning of a business relationship between the parties); Mary Tepper, Note,
Works Made ForHire andthe CopyrightAct of 1976-We're FinallyBack Where
We Started: Community ForCreativeNon-Violence v. Reid,109 S. Ct 2166 (1989),
59 U. CIN. L. REv. 299 (1990) (finding the Reid decision as "allowing
predictability in future dealings"); Corey L. Wishner, Note, Whose Work is it
Anyway? Revisiting Communityfor CreativeNon-Violence v. Reid in Defining the
Employer Employee Relationship Under the "Work Made For Hire" Doctrine, 12
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resolve the conflicting tests employed by the circuit courts.16 On the
other hand, the Court's list of agency law principles have provided
the district and circuit courts with a new conflict: application of the
Reid Factors. The Supreme Court's goal to restore predictability to
a work made for hire determination seems to have been defeated by
its own test. By not providing any guidance or "formula," the Reid
Factors have produced discrepancies among and within the circuits.
Some of the circuits that have confronted the Reid Factors have
added new factors or shaped the list of Reid Factors into some type
of structured or weighted approach. For example, in 1992, the Third
Circuit in Marco v. Accent PublishingCo.'69 added three more agency
principles to the Reid Factors, as well as, an "actual control" factor. 170
The Sixth Circuit has also considered factors not enumerated in Reid.
In Hi-Tech Video ProductionsInc. v. CapitalCities/ABC Inc.,'71 the
Sixth Circuit gave great weight to the parties' own perception of their
relationship." Another approach, formulated by the Second Circuit,
was a weighted application consisting of five relevant Reid Factors."'
This approach, articulated inAymes v. Bonelli and followed in Carter,
focuses on the significant factors and discards the irrelevant or
indeterminate factors. These different approaches, while all
employing some type of weighting system, continue to evolve with
work for hire case law.
Not surprisingly, these various approaches have produced
inconsistent results among the circuits. An illustration shows that
HoFsTRA L. REv. 393 (1995) (criticizing the factors as enumerated by the Supreme
Court in Reid as too vague but hailing circuit court decisions employing a weighted

or structured approach to the Factors).
168. See supra note 80 for the conflicting approaches among the circuits.
169. 969 F.2d 1547 (3d Cir. 1992).
170. Id at 1550 (noting that the Supreme Court in Reid did consider the actual
control of the work, even though this factor was not listed as an agency principle).
The three additional Restatement factors the court relied on were the hired party's
occupation, local custom and the parties' understanding of their relationship. Id.
The four additional factors under the Third Circuit approach brings the total
number of Reid Factors to sixteen.
171. 58 F.3d 1093 (6th Cir. 1995).
172. Id. at 1097-98 (giving significant weight to the witness' choice of terms to
describe the relationship).
173. Aymes v. Bonelli, 980 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1992).
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different approaches among the circuits, even seemingly modest
differences, can produce opposite results. For example, the Second
Circuit's Carter decision could have been resolved for the artists
under the Sixth Circuit approach in High-Tech.7 4 Although the Sixth
Circuit in Hi-Tech noted with approval the Second Circuit's weighted
Aymes approach of the Reid Factors, 7 ' it substantially relied on a
factor explicitly rejected by the Second Circuit: the perceptions of
the parties. 76 In Hi-Tech, the court found the hiring party's
testimony, using of words like "freelancers" and "independent
contractors" to describe the hired parties, was "highly indicative of
his assistants' independent contractor status.""' The Second Circuit
in Carter,on the other hand, refused to consider the perceptions the
parties had of their own relationship. The Second Circuit dismissed
the district court's finding of the artists' copyright ownership as
174. 58 F.3d 1093, 1094-95 (6th Cir. 1995). This case involved an allegation
of copyright infringement. High-Tech, a video production company, had produced
a "video postcard" of Mackinac Island in May, 1990 and registered it as a work
made for hire with the Copyright Office. Id at 1094. In early 1990, the producers
at "Good Morning America" used a clip from the video without permission or
acknowledgment in a feature story about Mackinac Island. Id Hi-Tech sued ABC
for copyright infringement. ABC challenged the copyright claim as invalid since
the work was created by independent contractors and, therefore, not a work made
for hire. Id The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's finding of a work made
for hire and, therefore, held the copyright invalid. See supra note 97-98 and
accompanying text discuzsing the circuit court's willingness to conduct a fresh
review of the facts.
175. Id at 1096-97 (stating its agreement "with the Second Circuit's approach"
to weigh the factors according to their significance in the case). The court found
the following factors significant to the case: the right to control, actual control,
skill required, method of payment, employee benefits, tax treatment, the scope of
the business and the perceptions of the parties. Id.at 1097-98.
176. Id at 1097-98 (noting that the Restatement of Agency provides additional
guidance to understanding a worker's employment status). The court found that
the perceptions of the parties were relevant to deciding the status of a hired party.
The Second Circuit in Carter,on the other hand, rejected any reliance on "magic
words" of the contract language to prove status. The court stated that it was not
persuaded by a "simplistic contention that usage of the works 'employ' or
'employment' in the agreements ...establishes that the plaintiffs were employees."
Carter,71 F.3d at 87. It also refused to consider the artists' copyright ownership
as evidence of the parties' perceptions.
177. Id.at 1098.
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probative evidence of the parties' view of their own relationship.
Presumably, the Sixth Circuit would have afforded the artists'
copyright ownership in Carter some weight since the ownership is
indicative of independent contractor status. In light of the close split
in factors for the parties in Carter, a consideration of the artists'
copyright ownership could have provided further evidence that the
artists were independent contractors. This illustration demonstrates
how the Reid Factors can render different results in the circuits.
Admittedly, a weighted approach to the Reid Factors, as opposed
to listed factors, provides a more structured guidance to determine the
status of the parties. However, even though an approach should be
tailored to the facts of each case, the courts should articulate why
each factor is relevant or indeterminate to the facts.'
The courts
should also be mindful that even in a weighted approach that no one
or even two factors can exclusively support a finding. In addition,
circuit courts need to give greater deference to district courts'
findings of fact in work made for hire determinations, just as circuit
courts give in other cases which require a factual review. Thus, a
tailoredapproach to the Reid Factors, one which fairly considers
each factor and articulates justifications for consideration or
elimination of each factor, is the suggested approach for a more
consistent application of the Reid Factors.
It is further recommended that when the Reid Factors are applied
to a moral rights inquiry the courts give the artistic control/freedom
factor more weight, in light of the purposes of VARA. The more
creative control an artist has over the work, the stronger her claims
are for protection of her creation. If the purpose of VARA includes
protecting an artist's personality, while also preserving national
culture, the courts should be inclined to give this factor more
178. The Second Circuit's Aymes approach, as applied, does not encourage the
articulation and justification for each Reid Factor. By setting out the five standard
"significant" factors to almost any case, the Second Circuit does not give sufficient
consideration to other Reid Factors. Furthermore, as illustrated in Carter,the five
factors articulated in Aymes will not always be the most significant factors to every
case.
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emphasis in its decision on moral rights.179 The courts should further
tailor the Reid Factors in a moral rights determination to recognize
VARA's goals.
There is a downside, though, to giving artistic control greater
weight. Such an approach may encourage hiring parties to restrict
their hired party's artistic freedom to avoid VARA protection. One
commentator notes that restraint on artistic freedom could result in
'plot art' which no one likes and no one would fight to preserve.""18
Recognizing this potential result, it is recommended that courts give
artistic freedom consideration, as well as, reviewing the other factors.
Thus, the tailored approach, while mindful of the purpose of moral
rights, should include a review of each factor.
The tailored approach, even when considering moral rights, is still
unsatisfactory. The Reid Factors, by themselves, do not alleviate the
preemptive effect a work made for hire finding has on an artist's
moral rights. Under the current statute, this clash between the
economic rights of an employer and the moral rights of a visual artistemployee will always sacrifice the latter's rights. Thus, the more
effective way to root-out this preemptive effect is through legislative
action, not judicial tests and factors. The final section suggests
changes to VARA which would help to recognize and to protect
moral rights for visual artist-employees.
C. VARA Revised: Recognizing Moral Rights in Employee Visual
Artists
As VARA currently stands, works made for hire are categorically
excluded from moral rights protection.' The two doctrines are not
incompatible in theory 8 ' and could exist harmoniously in practice.
Thus, this Article advocates recognizing the moral rights of
179. See 136 Cong. Rec. 12,607-08 (1990). (noting the goal of preserving
artists' personal rights to maintain the "integrity of our culture").
180. Thomas F. Berner, Bad Laws Make Hard Cases, N.Y. L.J., March 29,
1995, p. 2.
181. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
182. See supraIntroduction for the illustration that the two rights theoretically
exist in harmony.
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employee-visual artists.
This advocated approach only addresses the narrow, specific
category of works currently protected under VARA. The limited
works protected and the hurdles that an artist must overcome to make
out a claim for moral rights limit the application of this approach.
This narrow application furthers the goals of VARA8 3 while
remaining consistent with the theory of copyright protection."8 4
The current state of VARA protection is based on the firmly
entrenched policy of rewarding and protecting financial investments
in works of art. The argument therefore goes that works made for
hire are excluded from moral rights protection to reward employers
(and not their employees) for assuming a financial risk in production
of a copyrightable work. However, this rationale for barring visual
artist-employee's from their moral rights ignores the very definition
of the right: moral rights exist independently of economic rights.
Therefore, an employer can realize its economic reward
simultaneously with the recognition of the creator-employee's right
to attribution or integrity.
The visual artist-employee's right to attribution should be
recognized once the art has been displayed for public viewing. 85 For
example, the law should grant moral rights protection to an artistemployee who wishes to have her name removed from her publicly
displayed work which has been physically altered. 86 The public
display requirement would protect the employer's right to direct the
work while the work is in production. Thus, once a work has been
publicly displayed, an artist's honor or reputation can be impacted by
a modification. As illustrated, there would be no interference of the
employer's economic right by recognizing an artist-employee's right
to attribution (or, in this case, removal of her name)." 7
183. See supra note 48 for the dual goals of VARA: to protect the artist's
personality while maintaining the integrity of our country's culture.
184. See supra note 7 (noting the copyright goal in providing f-mancial
incentives to create).
185. Damich, supranote 11, at 988.
186. See supranotes 44-45 and accompanying text for definition of right of
attribution.
187. This illustration also applies to an artist-employee's right to have her name
attached to the work once the work is publicly displayed.
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The law should also recognize an artist-employee's right to
integrity for publicly displayed works.188 In fact, since the right of
integrity is the "most compelling case for moral rights protection"
because it protects irreplaceable works from modification or
destruction, the safeguarding of this right is essential to recognizing
moral rights at all.8 9 The right to prevent modification of a work of
visual art should be granted to the artist-employee once the court
finds that such alteration will result in prejudice to the artist's honor
or reputation."9 This approach will preserve the sanctity of visual art,
while discouraging employers from making changes to the art that
they could have made before the work was publicly displayed.
The right to prevent destruction of an irreplaceable work of art
presents the most compelling case for recognizing the artist's moral
rights claim. By definition, once an employer decides it wants to
destroy the work, it is no longer looking towards that work for
copyright enjoyment. Thus, the strong policy consideration for
protecting the employer's economic rights is eliminated, and an artist
should be allowed to preserve her work from destruction.
There is undoubtedly a more complicated issue when the art in
question is "site-specific" or, as in Carter, incorporated into the
building.' Although the employee has a strong right in the control
it can exercise over the work, absent a waiver, the artist-employee
should be granted the right to protect the work deemed of
"recognized stature."' 9 2 Furthermore, this right shall only be
protected for the life of the artist-employee and thus, not a permanent
restraint on the employer's control.' 93
This advocated approach, while not fully preserving either the
employer's economic right or an artist-employee's moral rights,
188. The public display requirement should exist for the same reasons that it
does for the right of attribution. The employer must be given protection for all
direction and control over the work until the work is on display for the viewing
public. Public display may not necessarily correspond with completion of the

work.
189. Damich, supranote 11, at 950.
190. See supranote 51.

191. Thus modification or removal would destroy the work.
192. See supra note 52.

193. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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would serve the purposes of both the Copyright Act and VARA.1 94
The law encourages the financing to produce works, while moral
rights theory protects the artist's creativity and skill from
exploitation. Thus, a "compromise" in approaches will realize both
of these equally important policies. It is time give moral rights the
recognition and protection these rights receive in most Berne
Convention countries.
CONCLUSION

VARA was an important first step for the United States in
recognizing its artists' claims to their moral rights. However, this
legislation is not in compliance with the Berne Convention and only
provides moral rights in very limited circumstances. This limitation
is impacted by VARA's categorical exclusion of works made for hire
from moral rights protection. Thus, the work made for hire
determination has profound consequences for the artist in recognizing
her moral rights.
The outcome of Carter v. Helmsley-Spear demonstrates the
weaknesses in VARA and the shortcomings of the Reid Factors. The
highly discretionary Reid Factors are currently producing inconsistent
results among and within the circuits. Therefore, a tailored approach
to the Reid Factors, while mindful of vindicating the purposes of
VARA and remaining faithfifl to the agency principles, is advocated
until VARA can be amended to recognize the moral rights of
employee-visual artists. Legislative action is the only way to root-out
the preemptive effect a work for hire finding has on an artist's moral
rights. The compromise advocated in this Article is an effective and
fair way to harmonize the economic right with the moral right in a
work made for hire.
194. Professor Roberta Rosenthal Kwall advocates that VARA be amended to

reflect a "reasonableness" standard for works made for hire instead of the current
flat exemption. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, How Fine Art Fares Post VARA, 1
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 1, 11 (1997). She recommends a balance-of-the

hardships approach. Id. For example, Professor Kwall suggests that the statute
should allow a court to weigh the artist's exercise of her moral rights against the
expected economic damage of the employer if the artist exercises these rights. Id.
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